Christianity as Cause of Problems

Freud's account of religion as universal obsessional neurosis provides the most psychologically developed case for Christianity as a cause of personal problems — but Alston's philosophical critique and Freud's own concessions reveal its decisive limitations.

Freud's case has two distinct components. First, at the individual level (The Future of an Illusion, 1927): religious belief is a wish-fulfilment illusion — a projection of the human desire for a powerful protective father onto the cosmos, driven by fear of death, natural calamity and the terrors of existence. Christianity's specific doctrines — divine judgment, mortal sin, the fear of hell — generate guilt, anxiety and repression that are the direct cause of individual neurotic unhappiness. Second, at the social level (Civilisation and its Discontents, 1930): religion keeps the masses docile by promising post-mortem reward and divine authority for existing social arrangements — which preserves unjust social structures and makes resistance to oppression feel like defiance of God. As divinityphilosophy.net confirms: "Freud saw all religion as a 'universal obsessional neurosis' which supported irrational beliefs and behaviour and created taboos which are often harmful to individuals." Christianity's moral teachings on sexuality — condemning premarital sex, contraception, homosexuality — are, on Freud's account, paradigmatic examples of the repression that causes personal unhappiness by imposing impossible demands on natural human instincts.

However, Alston (1967) provides the decisive philosophical objection: "Freudian theory is not logically incompatible with the truth, justifiability and value of traditional religion." The fact that religious belief can be psychologically explained as wish-fulfilment does not establish that it is false — the genetic fallacy shows that identifying the psychological origin of a belief does not determine its truth value. Belief in God may be both psychologically generated by human needs and true — Freud's projection theory establishes nothing about the truth of Christian claims, only about a possible psychological mechanism for their adoption. Furthermore, Freud himself concedes the ambiguity of his case: the divinityphilosophy.net analysis notes that if "projecting God fulfils wishes and so makes people happy, not unhappy," then Freud's own framework suggests that religion — including Christianity — may increase rather than decrease personal happiness, even if it involves comforting delusions.

Freud can respond that the happiness produced by religious illusion is the happiness of infantile dependence rather than genuine adult flourishing — and that a mature humanity, facing reality without the crutch of supernatural consolation, would achieve a more authentic and ultimately more satisfying human existence. The personal harm is not primarily the neurosis of the devout believer but the civilisational cost of a humanity that remains psychologically dependent and morally immature.

The maturity response is plausible as a speculative developmental claim but is empirically unsupported: the most secularised societies have not demonstrated the enhanced psychological health and moral maturity that Freud's theory predicts. The Heritage Foundation Report (2006) provides direct empirical counter-evidence: "a steadily growing body of evidence from the social sciences demonstrates that religious practice benefits individuals, families and communities, and thus the nation as a whole" — with religious believers showing higher average levels of wellbeing, social engagement, health and longevity than non-believers. This is not compatible with the claim that Christianity is a major cause of personal problems, even if it causes genuine difficulties for some individuals.

Freud's account of personal harm is philosophically self-undermining (Alston's genetic fallacy response) and empirically contradicted (the Heritage Foundation data) — making the personal harm claim partially but not predominantly fair.

Dawkins' case that Christianity is a major cause of social problems — through anti-intellectualism, sectarian violence and the corruption of children's critical faculties — is the most comprehensive secularist social critique but systematically overstates the causal claim and ignores countervailing evidence.

Dawkins' social harm case has three main components. First, anti-intellectualism: Christianity's rejection of evolution (creationism), historical resistance to scientific progress (Galileo), and the teaching of faith as a virtue independent of evidence produces a population less capable of the critical reasoning on which a free society depends. Second, sectarian violence: the Crusades, the Inquisition, the Wars of Religion, Northern Ireland — Christianity has been a major driver of organised violence between communities, and the association of religious identity with ethnic and political conflict continues in multiple global contexts. Third, child indoctrination: Dawkins argues in The God Delusion that teaching children religious beliefs before they can critically evaluate them is a form of child abuse — it corrupts the development of rational faculties at the stage when they are most vulnerable to authoritative adult imposition. The Seneca notes confirm: "Dawkins argues that certain denominations of Christianity reject the indisputable advances of science and hold society back."

However, Dawkins' case is guilty of systematic selection bias — attributing to Christianity the social harms associated with its worst historical expressions while ignoring the social goods generated by its best. The same tradition that produced the Crusades also produced Francis of Assisi, Wilberforce's abolition, King's civil rights movement, Mother Teresa's work in Calcutta, and the founding of hospitals, universities and food banks. Furthermore, the 20th century's most catastrophic social violence — the Holocaust, Stalin's gulags, Mao's Cultural Revolution — were perpetrated by explicitly secular regimes, suggesting that the secularisation Dawkins recommends is no guarantee of reduced social violence and may actively remove the moral constraints that religious tradition provides. Dawkins' own position is also self-undermining: his 2024 "cultural Christian" declaration — "I like to live in a culturally Christian country" — directly contradicts the "root of all evil" diagnosis by conceding that Christianity's cultural influence is something he positively values.

Dawkins can respond that the social goods Christians point to — abolition, civil rights, hospitals — were achieved by individuals motivated by Christian faith but not by institutional Christianity itself, which consistently opposed moral progress until public opinion forced it to change. The cultural inheritance he values as a "cultural Christian" is the residue of Christianity's best influences, separable from the metaphysical claims and institutional religion that caused the harm.

The separation of cultural inheritance from institutional religion is philosophically available but practically questionable: Wilberforce's abolition campaign was explicitly evangelical-institutional, King's civil rights movement was rooted in the black church tradition, and the liberation theology movement shows that institutionally committed Christianity remains one of the world's most powerful forces for social justice. Dawkins' "root of all evil" claim is the most unfair element of the social harm case: attributing the Crusades to Christianity as a major cause of social problems while exempting secular political violence (the 20th century's far larger body count) from equivalent scrutiny reveals a double standard that significantly weakens the claim's fairness.

Dawkins' social harm case correctly identifies genuine historical problems — sectarian violence, anti-intellectualism, child indoctrination — but the selection bias, the secular violence counter-evidence, and his own cultural Christianity concession together show that Christianity is not fairly described as a major cause of social problems.