
Descartes believed that reality is made of two completely different types of substance: res cogitans (thinking substance/mind) and res extensa (extended substance/body). The mind is non-physical, has no location in space, cannot be divided, and its essence is thinking. The body is physical, takes up space, can be divided, and its essence is extension. Because they have completely opposite properties, they must be two separate things that can exist independently of each other. You are essentially your mind—a thinking thing—and your body is just the physical machine that your mind interacts with.
Substance dualism (also called Cartesian dualism after Descartes) is the theory that there are two fundamentally different kinds of substance in the universe:
These are not just two different aspects of one thing. They are two completely separate, independent substances with totally different natures.
A substance, for Descartes, is something that can exist by itself without needing anything else (except God, who created everything). Mental substance can exist without physical substance, and physical substance can exist without mental substance.
Descartes uses Latin terms for precision. Res cogitans means "thinking thing" or "thinking substance".
The essential property of res cogitans is thought (which includes all conscious mental states: thinking, doubting, believing, willing, imagining, feeling).
Key characteristics of res cogitans:
For Descartes, you are essentially your mind. When you say "I," you're referring to your thinking substance, not your body.
Res extensa means "extended thing" or "extended substance".
The essential property of res extensa is extension—taking up space in three dimensions.
Key characteristics of res extensa:
The body, for Descartes, is basically a sophisticated machine—a physical object governed by the laws of physics.
What makes Descartes' dualism so radical is that mind and body are defined as complete opposites:
| Property | Mind (Res Cogitans) | Body (Res Extensa) |
|---|---|---|
| Extension | Non-extended (not in space) | Extended (occupies space) |
| Divisibility | Indivisible (no parts) | Divisible (has parts) |
| Essence | Thinking | Extension |
| Consciousness | Conscious and aware | No consciousness |
| Material | Immaterial | Material |
Because they have completely opposite essential properties, they cannot be the same thing. They must be two distinct substances.
Descartes offers several arguments for substance dualism. The most famous is the conceivability argument:
In simpler terms: I can imagine my mind existing without my body (perhaps as a disembodied consciousness). I can imagine my body existing without my mind (as a corpse or a mindless machine). If I can clearly conceive of them existing separately, then they must really be separate things.
Descartes' argument relies heavily on the notion of clear and distinct perceptions.
For example, "I think, therefore I am" (cogito ergo sum) is clear and distinct. When you're thinking, you cannot possibly doubt that you exist as a thinking thing.
Descartes claims that whatever he clearly and distinctly perceives to be true must actually be true, because God (who exists and is not a deceiver) would not allow him to be systematically deceived about things he perceives with perfect clarity.
So when Descartes clearly and distinctly perceives that his mind is non-extended and his body is extended, he concludes this must reflect their actual natures.
Descartes offers another argument based on divisibility:
In other words: Your body can be divided—you can lose a limb, organs can be removed. But your mind seems to be a unified whole. If you "divided" your mind, you wouldn't get two half-minds—the idea doesn't even make sense. This shows that mind and body are fundamentally different.
Descartes famously arrives at his first certainty: "I think, therefore I am" (Cogito, ergo sum).
He can doubt everything—his senses, his body, the external world. But he cannot doubt that he is thinking, because the very act of doubting is itself a form of thinking.
If he's thinking, then he must exist. Therefore, "I exist" is certain.
But what is this "I" that exists? Descartes concludes: I am essentially a thinking thing—a res cogitans.
He can be certain of his existence as a thinking thing without being certain that he has a body. Since he can know with certainty that he exists as a mind but cannot yet know with certainty that his body exists, the mind must be more fundamental to his identity than the body.
Even if his body turned out to be an illusion, he would still exist as a thinking thing. Therefore, he is essentially his mind, not his body.
If mind and body are completely different substances, how do they interact?
This is the famous mind-body problem that has plagued philosophy ever since Descartes.
Descartes admits that mind and body clearly do interact:
But how can an immaterial, non-spatial mind cause changes in a material, spatial body?
How can something with no location in space push or pull something that exists in space?
Descartes' answer: the mind and body interact at a specific location in the brain called the pineal gland.
But this answer is widely regarded as unsatisfactory, because it doesn't explain how the interaction occurs—it just identifies where it supposedly occurs.
If the mind has no spatial location, how can it be "at" the pineal gland? And how can a non-physical thing causally affect a physical thing? This remains one of the major objections to substance dualism.
Just because you can conceive of two things being separate doesn't mean they actually can be separate.
For example, before we discovered that water is H₂O, people could conceive of water existing without H₂O. But in reality, water is H₂O—they're identical. So conceivability doesn't guarantee actual separability.
Similarly, maybe the mind seems separable from the body, but they're actually the same thing (the mind is just what the brain does).
Descartes assumes that the way the mind appears to itself is the way the mind actually is.
But maybe the mind only appears indivisible when in fact it has parts we're not aware of. Modern neuroscience suggests the mind/brain does have distinct regions and functions that can be separated (for example, split-brain patients).
Descartes claimed all physical things are divisible because they're extended. But modern physics has discovered quarks—fundamental particles that are physical but indivisible.
This undermines Descartes' premise that all extended things are divisible. If quarks are indivisible physical things, then maybe the mind could also be an indivisible physical thing.
As mentioned above, substance dualism struggles to explain how mind and body interact if they're completely different kinds of substances.
Descartes wasn't just doing abstract philosophy. He had a religious motive.
If the mind is a completely separate substance from the body, then the mind can exist without the body.
This provides philosophical support for belief in the immortality of the soul.
When your body dies, your mind (soul) can continue to exist independently. It doesn't need the body to survive.
This is why Descartes wrote the Meditations: to provide a rational, mathematical proof that the soul is immortal, which would encourage people to live virtuously in hopes of heavenly reward and fear of hellish punishment.
Descartes explicitly rejects Aristotle's hylomorphism:
For Aristotle, when the body dies, the soul dies too (mostly). For Descartes, when the body dies, the soul continues.
Descartes' substance dualism has been hugely influential:
Even though most philosophers and scientists today reject substance dualism in favor of physicalism, Descartes' arguments remain essential for understanding debates about consciousness and personal identity.
"On the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it."
"It is not necessary to ask whether soul and body are one, just as it is not necessary to ask whether the wax and its shape are one... For even if one and being are spoken of in several ways, what is properly so spoken of is the actuality."