Evidential Problem of Evil
Summary
The evidential problem of evil argues that while God and evil are not logically incompatible, the amount and types of suffering in the world provide strong inductive evidence against God's existence. Unlike the logical problem (which claims God and evil cannot coexist), the evidential problem claims God and evil could coexist, but based on the evidence we observe, it's unlikely that they do. William Rowe argues that instances of gratuitous (pointless) suffering—like a fawn burning alone in a forest fire with no apparent greater good—are so numerous and intense that a perfectly good, all-powerful God would have prevented them. Since an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good being would prevent all gratuitous suffering but gratuitous suffering clearly exists, the evidence strongly suggests such a God does not exist. This is an inductive, a posteriori argument based on observation of the world, not logical deduction.
Key Differences from the Logical Problem
| Element | Logical Problem | Evidential Problem |
|---|---|---|
| Type | Deductive | Inductive |
| Claim | Incompatible (impossible) | Unlikely (improbable) |
| A priori/A posteriori | A priori | A posteriori |
| Key Concept | Logical contradiction | Gratuitous evil as evidence |
| To Defeat It | Show ONE possible scenario where God and evil coexist | Show evidence does NOT make atheism more probable |
| Current Consensus | Mostly defeated by Plantinga | Still widely debated and serious challenge |
Why the Evidential Problem Is Harder to Defeat
The logical problem can be defeated by showing just one logically possible scenario where God and evil coexist. The evidential problem requires showing that the evidence does not make atheism more probable than theism—a much harder task.
William Rowe's Evidential Argument
Who Was William Rowe?
William L. Rowe (1933-2015) was an American philosopher who formulated the most influential version of the evidential problem of evil in his famous 1979 article "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism". It's considered "the clearest, most easily understood, and most intuitively appealing" of all evidential arguments because it focuses on specific, concrete examples rather than abstract principles.
Rowe's Formal Argument
Premise 1 (Factual/Evidential Premise)
"There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse."
In other words: Gratuitous evil exists.
Premise 2 (Theological Premise)
"An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse."
In other words: An all-good God would prevent all gratuitous evil.
Conclusion
"There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being."
In other words: God (as traditionally conceived) does not exist.
The Inductive Structure
Rowe argues from:
- "No good we know of justifies God allowing this suffering"
- to: "No good at all justifies God allowing this suffering"
This is an inductive inference, not a deductive one. We apply the principle of warranted induction: if it appears to us that suffering serves no purpose, it probably doesn't. This inductive step is the vulnerability of Rowe's argument—critics argue that just because we can't see a justifying good doesn't mean one doesn't exist.
The Concept of Gratuitous Evil
Definition
An instance of evil is gratuitous (or pointless) if:
An omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented it without thereby:
- Losing some greater good, OR
- Permitting some evil equally bad or worse
In other words: it serves no justifiable purpose in God's plan.
Examples of Potential Gratuitous Evil
- A child suffering from cancer with no apparent greater good resulting
- An earthquake destroying a village of innocent people
- An animal burning alive in a forest fire, suffering for days
- Factory farming causing billions of animals to suffer
- The Holocaust
The key insight: Many instances of suffering seem to serve no purpose—they don't lead to virtue development, moral growth, greater goods, or anything that would justify an all-good, all-powerful God in allowing them.
Rowe's Famous Example: The Fawn in the Forest Fire
The Scenario
"Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering."
Why This Example Works
- Natural evil (not caused by human free will)
- Innocent victim (the fawn didn't cause the fire)
- No greater good apparent (the fawn's suffering teaches no one anything; it doesn't develop anyone's virtue)
- No worse evil prevented (God could have just prevented the fire or quickly ended the fawn's life)
- Relatable yet disturbing (most people find this example emotionally compelling)
Rowe's Question
"Could an omnipotent, omniscient being have easily prevented the fawn from being horribly burned, or, given the burning, could have spared the fawn the intense suffering by quickly ending its life, rather than allowing the fawn to lie in terrible agony for several days?"
The answer: Obviously yes. An omnipotent being could easily do this. So why didn't God prevent or end the fawn's suffering?
Responses to the Evidential Problem
Response 1: Skeptical Theism
Skeptical theism is the view that God might have morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil that are beyond our comprehension. We are not in a good epistemic position (not in a good position to know) to judge whether particular evils are gratuitous.
Just as an ant cannot understand a human's reasons for doing something, we cannot understand God's reasons for allowing suffering. William Alston argues: "If it is epistemically possible that there is an x, we are not justified in believing that there is no x." In other words: If it's possible that God has good reasons for allowing suffering (even if we can't understand them), we cannot justify concluding God doesn't exist.
Criticism: If we're too skeptical of our ability to judge God's reasons, doesn't this undermine all theodicies and defenses? Skeptical theism seems to make belief in God easier to justify but at the cost of making all theological claims unjustifiable.
Response 2: The Soul-Making Theodicy (Hick)
Some suffering serves the purpose of soul-making—developing moral virtue and spiritual growth. A world without challenges and suffering would prevent the development of virtues like courage, compassion, perseverance, and faith.
Problem: Much suffering (particularly natural evils) doesn't seem to serve this purpose. Animal suffering before humans existed or in remote areas serves no soul-making function. The amount of suffering seems excessive for soul-making purposes. Childhood cancer, for example, doesn't seem to develop the sufferer's virtue—it just causes agony.
Response 3: The Free Will Defense (Plantinga)
Much moral evil (evil caused by humans) results from the misuse of free will. An omnipotent God cannot (logically) create free beings who always freely choose good. Therefore, allowing moral evil is justified by the value of free will.
Problem: Free will theodicy might explain moral evil but not natural evil (earthquakes, disease, animal suffering). The amount of natural evil seems excessive and unjustifiable. Why would an all-powerful God allow as much natural evil as exists?
Response 4: The Greater Good Defense
While we cannot see the greater good that justifies particular evils, we must trust that God has good reasons we cannot understand.
Problem: This is similar to skeptical theism and faces the same criticism: if God's reasons are completely beyond comprehension, how do we know they exist at all?
Paul Draper's Argument: Hypothesis of Indifference
Who Is Paul Draper?
Paul Draper is a contemporary philosopher who offers a variation of the evidential argument. Rather than arguing "God probably doesn't exist," Draper argues that the hypothesis of indifference (the universe is indifferent to human and animal suffering) is more likely than theism given the evidence.
The Argument
Compare two hypotheses: Theism vs. Hypothesis of Indifference (a universe without design or purpose). Given observed patterns of suffering (especially the biological role of pain as a warning system that sometimes causes more suffering than necessary), which hypothesis is more probable?
Draper argues that indifference fits the evidence better. Why? Under theism, God would design an optimal system to reduce suffering while maintaining free will and soul-making. Under indifference, suffering would result from blind natural processes with no regard for wellbeing.
The actual world looks more like what blind processes would produce than what an all-good God would design.
Scholarly Perspectives
"Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering. So far as we can see, the fawn's intense suffering is pointless. For there does not appear to be any greater good such that the prevention of the fawn's suffering would require either the loss of that good or the occurrence of an evil equally bad or worse."
"There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. Therefore, there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being."
Key Takeaways
- ✓Evidential problem: evil makes God's existence unlikely (not logically impossible)
- ✓Inductive, a posteriori argument based on observed suffering
- ✓Central concept: gratuitous (pointless) suffering serves no greater good
- ✓William Rowe: most influential formulator of evidential argument
- ✓Rowe's fawn example: intense suffering with no apparent purpose
- ✓Inductive inference: 'no good we know of' → 'probably no good at all'
- ✓Inductive step is vulnerable point: we might not understand God's reasons
- ✓Skeptical theism response: God might have incomprehensible reasons for allowing evil
- ✓Soul-making theodicy response: suffering develops moral virtue
- ✓But soul-making doesn't explain natural evil (earthquakes, disease, animal suffering)
- ✓Paul Draper: hypothesis of indifference more probable than theism
- ✓Most philosophers think evidential problem is harder to solve than logical problem
- ✓Debate remains active and theism remains philosophically defended despite problem