
Naturalism is the meta-ethical view that moral terms like "good" and "right" can be defined using natural facts—facts about the physical world that we can observe and measure. For example, Jeremy Bentham (a naturalist) argued that "good" = pleasure and "bad" = pain—both are natural properties of organisms. When we say "Charity is good," we are really saying "Charity produces pleasure/maximises happiness". Naturalism is a form of moral realism—it claims moral facts exist objectively and are discoverable through science or reason. The big problem for naturalism is the is-ought gap (Hume) and G.E. Moore's naturalistic fallacy—both argue you can't define "good" as a natural property without making a logical error.
Naturalism is the view that moral properties (goodness, rightness) are identical to natural properties (features of the physical world that can be studied by science). Naturalists believe:
Statements like "X is good" are factual claims about the natural world, not subjective feelings or mysterious non-natural properties.
Hume argued that you cannot logically derive an "ought" (moral claim) from an "is" (natural fact).
Example:
Hume says this is a logical leap—we need an extra premise linking "is" to "ought".
Naturalists claim that moral facts are natural facts, so there is no gap: "X is good" simply means "X maximises pleasure," which is a factual claim.
If "good" just meant "pleasurable," then saying "pleasure is good" would be saying "pleasure is pleasurable"—a tautology that doesn't tell us anything.
Moore formalised Hume's point into a fallacy: assuming that because something is natural, it is good.
Example:
This is a fallacy—nature includes disease, violence, and suffering, which are not good.
You cannot define "good" in terms of any natural property (pleasure, happiness, desire‑satisfaction) without making a logical mistake.
If you try to define "good" as "pleasure," ask yourself: "Is pleasure good?"
Because it's always an open question, goodness cannot be identical to any natural property.
Naturalism
Non-Naturalism (G.E. Moore)
Anti-Realism (Ayer, Emotivism)
"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do."
Bentham's classic statement of ethical naturalism. He claims that pleasure and pain are natural properties that determine morality. This makes ethics scientific and objective.
"If I am asked, 'What is good?' my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked 'How is good to be defined?' my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it. But if you say 'Pleasure is good,' I shall ask 'Is it good?' and you will see that the question is not a closed question but an open one."
Moore's open question argument showing that defining "good" as "pleasure" is incoherent. The question "Is pleasure good?" remains meaningful, proving that goodness is not identical to any natural property.
Moral properties like "good" can be defined in terms of natural properties like pleasure or happiness.
They reduce "good" to observable, natural properties that can be studied scientifically.
You can't logically get from "is" (natural fact) to "ought" (moral claim) without an additional premise.
You can't define "good" as any natural property without making a logical error.
If "good" = "pleasure," then "Is pleasure good?" would be a closed question (tautology), but it's actually open, so goodness ≠ pleasure.
Naturalism is a form of moral realism (objective moral facts exist) and cognitivism (moral language expresses beliefs).
Differs from Moore's non-naturalism (indefinable goodness) and emotivism/error theory (no moral facts).
| Aspect | Description |
|---|---|
| Core Claim | Moral properties = Natural properties |
| Key Examples | Bentham: "Good = Pleasure"; Mill: "Good = Happiness" |
| Moral Language | Cognitive (expresses beliefs that can be true/false) |
| Meta‑Ethical Type | Cognitivist (beliefs) + Realist (objective facts) |
| Main Critics | Hume (is‑ought gap); Moore (naturalistic fallacy, open question); Ayer (emotivism) |
| Strengths | Scientific, objective, practical (Hedonic Calculus) |
| Weaknesses | Naturalistic fallacy, is‑ought gap, struggles with moral disagreement |